Condorcet Domains: The Mathematics of Coherent Collective Decision-Making
暫譯: 康多塞領域：一致性集體決策的數學
Puppe, Clemens, Slinko, Arkadii
- 出版商: Springer
- 出版日期: 2026-04-24
- 售價: $3,450
- 貴賓價: 9.5 折 $3,277
- 語言: 英文
- 頁數: 215
- 裝訂: Hardcover - also called cloth, retail trade, or trade
- ISBN: 3032151155
- ISBN-13: 9783032151155
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相關分類:
離散數學 Discrete-mathematics
海外代購書籍(需單獨結帳)
相關主題
商品描述
This book offers a comprehensive account of Condorcet domains--structured sets of preference orders in which the pairwise majority relation remains transitive for any odd-numbered group of voters. These domains form the foundation for normatively robust voting procedures and enable strong possibility results in incentive-compatible mechanism design.
Well-known examples include single-peaked, single-crossing, and group-separable domains. The study of Condorcet domains bridges multiple disciplines, including economics, political science, mathematics, and computer science, and has seen significant theoretical advances in recent years.
This monograph systematically presents these developments, covering both foundational concepts and cutting-edge results. It will be of interest to economists, mathematicians, and scholars in related fields seeking a deep understanding of preference aggregation and its structural underpinnings.
"This interdisciplinary book by Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko offers a canonical reference on the mathematical foundations of Condorcet domains. It shows how discrete convexity, median graphs, and permutation lattices play a central role in understanding coherent collective decision-making, and applies the insights to voting systems and incentive compatibility."
-- Prof. Hervé Moulin, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom
商品描述(中文翻譯)
這本書提供了關於康多塞領域的全面介紹——這是一種結構化的偏好順序集合，其中成對的多數關係對於任何奇數選民群體保持傳遞性。這些領域構成了規範上穩健的投票程序的基礎，並使得在激勵相容的機制設計中能夠實現強有力的可能性結果。
著名的例子包括單峰、單交叉和群體可分離領域。康多塞領域的研究跨越了多個學科，包括經濟學、政治學、數學和計算機科學，並在近年來取得了顯著的理論進展。
這本專著系統地呈現了這些發展，涵蓋了基礎概念和前沿結果。對於尋求深入理解偏好聚合及其結構基礎的經濟學家、數學家和相關領域的學者來說，這本書將會引起他們的興趣。
*「這本由Clemens Puppe和Arkadii Slinko合著的跨學科書籍，提供了康多塞領域數學基礎的經典參考。它展示了離散凸性、中位數圖和排列格在理解一致的集體決策中所扮演的核心角色，並將這些見解應用於投票系統和激勵相容性。」*
-- Hervé Moulin教授，英國格拉斯哥大學亞當·史密斯商學院
作者簡介
Clemens Puppe is Professor of Economic Theory at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), where he also serves as co-director of the Institute of Economics. He studied Mathematics and Philosophy at Heidelberg University and the Free University of Berlin, and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Karlsruhe with a thesis on individual decision-making under uncertainty. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, particularly decision theory and social choice theory, with contributions to the measurement of freedom, diversity theory, judgment aggregation, and strategy-proof voting rules.
Prof. Puppe has held academic positions at the University of Vienna, the University of Bonn, and visiting appointments at institutions including Harvard University, the University of Auckland, and Oxford University. He is co-editor of the Handbook of Rational and Social Choice and served as managing editor of Social Choice and Welfare from 2012 to 2024.
Arkadii M. Slinko is currently Professor of Mathematics at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. Before taking this position in 1993 he was a Senior Research Fellow of the interdisciplinary Institute of Systems Analysis of Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. He has published extensively in a wide range of journals in mathematics, computer science, economics, and politics. His current research focuses on the mathematics of social choice, game theory, and secret sharing.
作者簡介(中文翻譯)
Clemens Puppe 是卡爾斯魯厄理工學院 (KIT) 的經濟理論教授，同時擔任經濟學研究所的共同主任。他在海德堡大學和柏林自由大學學習數學和哲學，並在卡爾斯魯厄大學獲得博士學位，論文主題為不確定性下的個體決策。他的研究專注於微觀經濟理論，特別是決策理論和社會選擇理論，並對自由的測量、多樣性理論、判斷聚合和策略無關的投票規則做出了貢獻。
Puppe 教授曾在維也納大學、波恩大學擔任學術職位，並在哈佛大學、奧克蘭大學和牛津大學等機構擔任訪問職位。他是 Handbook of Rational and Social Choice 的共同編輯，並於 2012 年至 2024 年擔任 Social Choice and Welfare 的主編。
Arkadii M. Slinko 目前是新西蘭奧克蘭大學的數學教授。在 1993 年擔任此職位之前，他是俄羅斯科學院莫斯科系統分析跨學科研究所的高級研究員。他在數學、計算機科學、經濟學和政治學的多個期刊上發表了大量文章。他目前的研究專注於社會選擇的數學、博弈論和秘密分享。
