An extended argument that cognitive phenomena--perceiving, imagining, remembering--can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena--perceiving, imagining, remembering--can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book
Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others--the most elementary ones--do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones.
Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless--fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix.
《演化啟蒙主義》主張，認知現象——感知、想像、記憶——最好以無內容和涉及內容的認知形式之間的界面來解釋。在他們早期的著作《激進啟蒙主義》的基礎上，丹尼爾·哈托（Daniel Hutto）和埃里克·邁因（Erik Myin）展示了認識到只有某些形式的認知具有內容，而其他——最基本的形式——則沒有內容，這一點的獨特解釋優勢。他們提出了一種雙重思維的心智解釋，提出了一種複雜的心智視野，其中這些基本的無內容認知形式與涉及內容的形式互動。
哈托和邁因認為，最基本的認知形式不像目前流行的認知解釋所說的那樣，涉及到接收和處理信息，然後在大腦中使用、重複使用、存儲和表示。相反，基本的認知是無內容的——基本上是互動的、動態的和關聯的。在推進對認知的激進啟蒙主義解釋的案例時，哈托和邁因對我們對認知的概念提出了重要的調整，並為他們的革命性重新思考提供了理論支持，強調其以自然主義的方式解釋基本心智的能力。他們展示了雙重認知視野的解釋力，展示了它如何提供強大的手段來理解典型的認知現象，而不引入科學上棘手的神秘因素。
Daniel D. Hutto is Professor of Philosophical Psychology at the University of Wollongong and the author of
Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis for Understanding Reasons (MIT Press) and coauthor of
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (MIT Press).
Erik Myin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Antwerp and coauthor of
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (MIT Press).
Daniel D. Hutto是澳洲伍倫貢大學哲學心理學教授，也是《Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis for Understanding Reasons》（MIT Press）的作者，以及《Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content》（MIT Press）的合著者。
Erik Myin是比利時安特衛普大學哲學教授，也是《Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content》（MIT Press）的合著者。
